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Abstract
What normative constraints should bind parents (or policy makers) if they inter-
vene in the choices of children (or constituencies) whose preferences evolve over
time? For a sophisticated child who anticipates correctly his preference change,
we prove that generically there exist parental interventions that are Pareto im-
proving over the backward induction path that the child will follow on his own.
If, in contrast, the child misperceives his future preferences, Pareto improving in-
terventions might not exist, and even nudges might be painfully sobering. The
parent may then choose to minimize the maximal disappointment along time that
her benevolent intervention would cause.
Parents, in the wide sense of the term, should want their children to be happy.
This is so within nuclear families, as well as between governments and their con-
stituencies. To this effect, parents may convey to their children information that
the children do not have in the first place. But after all is said, should parents, if
they can, intervene in their children’s choices to make them happier?
If children’s preferences over action paths do not change over time, there is no
such need: by the principle of optimality in dynamic programming, a child will
follow from one period to the next the same overall plan that already from the
very start he would like there to be implemented, and in particular no parental
intervention can further enhance the child’s happiness.
But what if the child’s preferences over action paths do change over time? In
each period, based on his current belief about his future preferences and beliefs,
the child would anticipate his own future reactions1 to any choice he can make to-
day, and then make a choice that together with these anticipated reactions would
be optimal according to his current preferences. With a finite horizon, like when
choosing education or vocational training before adulthood, or saving up to re-
tirement, this is done, implicitly if not explicitly, by backward induction. In other
words, the choices along time would constitute a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium (Strotz
1956, Pollak 1968, Goldman 1980), i.e. a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in
the ‘intrapersonal game’ (Laibson 1997) among the selves of the child across the
time periods.
The mature and experienced parent, in contrast, may forecast the preference
evolution more accurately than the child. In addition, she may have her own
perspective on how to ‘responsibly’ average or aggregate the child’s evolving pref-
erences along time into one preference relation over action plans, so as to balance
youthful vivacity with adult thriving. The optimal plan according to this aggre-
gated preference relation may very well differ from the path that the child will
follow by backward induction on his own.
So the normative question poses itself once again2: if the parent can, should she
intervene and induce the optimal plan according to her overall, aggregate view of
the child’s evolving preferences? The question is accentuated by the fact that if the
parent can intervene, non-intervention becomes one out of many possible decisions
that the parent can make, and as such non-intervention need not necessarily be
considered to be normatively neutral.
Some of the literature thus far (Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997, Jackson
and Yariv 2014, 2015, Kang 2019, Kang and Ye 2019) suggests that the parent
should restrict herself to interventions that are Pareto-improving, i.e. to inducing
action paths that the child deems at least as good as the backward induction
1Or, more generally, when the future is uncertain, the distribution of his own future reactions.
2See e.g. Ericson and Laibson 2019, open question 9.
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path in each and every period, and strictly better in at least one period. Such an
intervention may be thought of as normatively non-controversial, because in all
periods the child will welcome such a change, enforced by the commitment power
of the parent that the child himself lacks. The parent may then decide to induce
the plan which is optimal according to her aggregated preferences subject to the
Pareto-improvement constraint.
With this perspective, it is important to know whether Pareto-improving in-
terventions exist in the first place. In section 2 we therefore present a framework
that makes explicit that even though bygones are bygones, current well-being may
well depend also on remembered, past experience. In this framework we present
a general result: when the child is sophisticated, i.e. when in each period he
anticipates correctly his own future preference change, then Pareto-improving in-
terventions generically exist. That is, if for some preference evolution along time,
the subgame-perfect equilibrium path that a sophisticated child will follow on his
own so happens to be Pareto optimal, then with slightly perturbed preferences his
subgame-perfect equilibrium path will no longer be Pareto optimal, and, moreover,
neither will it be with further, smaller perturbations of the child’s preferences. In
other words, a sophisticated child chooses Pareto optimally by himself only with
knife-edge profiles of preferences3.
A more realistic assumption, though, is that a child with evolving preferences
is not perfectly sophisticated, but rather at least partially naive (O’Donoghue and
Rabin 1999), that is uncertain about his own future preferences, if not outright
wrong about them. In section 3 we therefore define a simple but general type-
space framework to encompass also such forms of naivite´. Nudges (Thaler and
Sunstein 2008), or more generally interventions that are purely informational, are
modeled in this type-space framework by a change in the state of the world that
expresses the new beliefs the child would then hold across the time periods.
We then show by example that with at least some naivite´, even when the opti-
mal path from the parent’s perspective differs from the backward induction path,
a Pareto-improving intervention might not exist, neither by inducing a different
path nor by a nudge. What should the parent do in such cases?
In section 4 we propose one possible answer, namely a normative approach
by which the parent should only intervene in a way that minimizes the maximal
disappointment of the child across the time periods, relative to the backward
induction benchmark. We show by way of example that subject to this minimax
constraint, there may indeed exist such an intervention that enhances the child’s
aggregated well-being from the parent’s perspective.
In fact, this normative approach may be applied also to cases in which Pareto-
3In particular, stable preferences which do not change over time is one such knife-edge case,
in which by the principle of optimality a sophisticated child chooses Pareto optimally.
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improving interventions do exist. In these cases, the normative criterion would call
the parent to choose only among interventions that maximize the minimal well-
being enhancement across the time periods. We show, again by way of example,
how this may (not surprisingly) alter the optimal path that the parent would induce
given this additional constraint, in comparison with her intervention subject only
to the Pareto-improvement constraint.
We conclude in section 6 with a discussion. Example details appear in the
appendix, and the genericity proof is in the online appendix.
1 Sophisticated children rarely choose
optimally on their own
For each period i = 1, ..., n, let Xi ⊂ Rki be the compact, convex choice set of the
child at period i, henceforth dubbed ‘self i’. A current self cannot ‘pre-program’
future selves’ choices.4
Denote X = X1× ...×Xn, and X≤i =
∏
j≤iXj the space up-to-i initial paths.
5
Let ui : X → R be the utility function of self i, where ui ∈ C2 (X,R) , the space
of twice continuously differentiable functions, endowed with the topology of the
norm ‖u‖ = supx∈X {‖u (x)‖ , ‖Du (x)‖ , ‖D2u (x)‖}. The space of utility profiles,
u = (u1, ..., un) ∈ U ≡
(
C2 (X,R)
)n
is endowed with the product topology. Sophistication means that with a utility
profile u, implicitly each self i anticipates correctly the future selves’ utility func-
tions ui+1, ..., un, knows that each future self j > i will also anticipate correctly its
own future selves’ utility functions uj+1, ..., un, etcetera.
6
Without intervention, a sophisticated child is assumed to choose by backward
induction, i.e. to follow the path xˆ = (xˆ1, ..., xˆn) induced by a Strotz-Pollak
equilibrium of best replies (bi : X≤i−1 → Xi)ni=1, which is a subgame-perfect equi-
librium of the perfect-information dynamic game between the selves.7 At such an
4Put differently, whatever device a particular self does have, if at all, for influencing future
selves’ behavior, choosing to influence future behavior in such a way is encoded within the
available choices xi ∈ Xi, and by the utility functions (as defined next) of future selves j˙ > i,
that depend in particular on xi.
5Or, more generally, X ⊆ X1 × ... ×Xn and X≤i ⊆
∏
j≤iXj – in case the past choice path
(x1, ..., xj−1) of the selves k < j may limit the feasible choices of self j.
6In section 3 below we will present an extended framework where this assumption can be made
explicit, a framework that also allows for various deviations from such perfect sophistication.
7For proofs of equilibrium existence see Harris (1985), Hellwig and Leininger (1987), Hellwig
et al. (1990), Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016). If best replies are not unique, breaking ties in
different ways may lead to multiple equilibria.
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equilibrium,
bn (x≤n−1) ∈ arg maxXn un (x≤n−1, ·) ,
bn−1 (x≤n−2) ∈ arg maxXn−1 un−1 (x≤n−2, ·, bn (x≤n−2, ·)) ,
bn−2 (x≤n−3) ∈ arg maxXn−2 un−2 (x≤n−3, ·, bn−1 (x≤n−3, ·) ,
bn (x≤n−3, ·, bn−1 (x≤n−3, ·))) ,
...
b1 (∅) ∈ arg maxX1 u1 (·, b2 (·) , b3 (·, b2 (·)) , ...) .
The corresponding backward induction path xˆ = (xˆ1, ..., xˆn) is then defined induc-
tively by
xˆ1 = b1 (∅) ,
xˆ2 = b2 (xˆ1) ,
xˆ3 = b3 (xˆ1, xˆ2) ,
...
xˆn = bn (xˆ1, xˆ2, ..., xˆn−1) .
It yields the utility levels uˆ = (uˆ1, ..., uˆn) where uˆi = ui (xˆ) .
The parent has an average/aggregation function V : Rn → R over the utility
levels of the different selves i = 1, ..., n. This defines, indirectly, the utility function
of the parent v : X → R over choice paths, v (x) = V (u1 (x) , ..., un (x)).
For simplicity we assume that the parent can oblige the child to follow any
path x ∈ X that the parent likes.8 Still, the parent may like to limit herself to a
subset of paths with some normatively desirable properties.
A path x ∈ X is a called a Pareto improvement over a path x¯ ∈ X if ui (x) ≥
ui (x¯) for every i = 1, ..., n, and uj (x) > uj (x¯) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Suppose,
first, that the parent would like to limit herself to inducing the child only to choice
paths x that are Pareto improvements over the backward induction path xˆ that
the child would follow on his own.
Example 1. A sophisticated child has to finish a chore of size 3 in three days
i = 1, 2, 3. Carrying out quantity xi of the chore on day i takes x
2
i hours, and
the child enjoys his remaining leisure time 24 − x2i .9 The child’s time preference
is captured by β − δ quasi-hyperbolic discounting, with β = 1
2
and δ = 1. At
days 2, 3 the child’s memory of his past leisure augments his well-being, with no
8We note that leading the child to follow a particular path x need not necessarily involve
direct coercion by the parent. Instead, the parent may be able to provide incentives for the child
to follow x, e.g. via taxes or subsidies accompanied by an unconditional lump-sum transfer, as
in Kang (2019).
9This example is similar to the ‘cake-eating’ problem under changing tastes, as analyzed e.g.
in Goldman (1979). Here, in contrast, the felicity from the good (leisure) is linear whereas the
’cost’ of leisure (time put aside for the chore) is convex.
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discounting. Thus, if the child’s division of the chore along days i = 1, 2, 3 is
x = (x1, x2, x3), his corresponding selves’ utility functions are
u1 (x1, x2, x3) = (24− x21) + 12 (24− x22) + 12 (24− x23) ,
u2 (x1, x2, x3) = (24− x21) + (24− x22) + 12 (24− x23) ,
u3 (x1, x2, x3) = (24− x21) + (24− x22) + (24− x23) .
Across the three days the parent values equally the child’s happiness10, leading
to the parent’s utility function
v (x1, x2, x3) =
1
3
3∑
i=1
ui (x1, x2, x3) =
(
24− x21
)
+
5
6
(
24− x22
)
+
2
3
(
24− x23
)
.
With the constraint x3 = 3 − x1 − x2, one can verify (see the details in the
appendix) that
x¯ = arg max
x1,x2
v (x1, x2, 3− x1 − x2)
is not a Pareto improvement over the backward induction path xˆ.
However, Pareto improvements over xˆ do exist:
(a) The child would be happy to work somewhat more on day 1 if only he could
know that he will be bound to work somewhat more also on day 2, and not leave
so much of the chore to the last day, as he correctly anticipates on day 1 that he
would be doing on day 2 without intervention;
(b) On day 2 the child would be happy to be committed to a package deal in
which he works somewhat more on both days 1 and 2; and
(c) On day 3 the child would definitely be happy if less of the largest share of
the chore is left for him to finish.
Moreover, the Pareto improving path x˘ that maximizes v satisfies v (x˘) > v (xˆ) ,
so the parent would like to intervene and induce x˘ (even though implementing the
non-Pareto improving x¯ would entail an even higher utility, v (x¯) > v (x˘)).
A path x˜ ∈ X is called Pareto optimal if there does not exist a Pareto im-
provement x ∈ X over x˜.
Theorem. There is an open and dense subset of utility profiles U0 ⊆ U of so-
phisticated children, for whom no interior backward induction path xˆ is Pareto
optimal.
The proof, based on a transversality argument, appears in the online appendix.
10Not the child’s leisure time – that would have amounted to a complete identification of the
parent with the child’s perspective on day 3, waving off the child’s perspectives on days 1 and 2.
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Thus, for sophisticated children with typical or generic utility profiles, namely
utility profiles in U0, there exists a Pareto improving path x ∈ X over any interior
backward induction path xˆ. If the parent can induce the child to follow a Pareto
improving x instead of xˆ, this will be weakly preferred by the child in all time
periods, and strictly preferred in some time period(s). Moreover, if the parent’s
utility is some weighted average of the child’s utility levels at the different time
periods, then also the parent will prefer to induce x instead of letting the child
follow the backward induction path xˆ on his own.
2 A type space for possible misperceptions of fu-
ture preferences
But children are not always sophisticated, and might anticipate their future pref-
erences, and therefore their future choices, differently than they will actually be.
Examples of such naivite´ or partial naivite´ were discussed e.g. by O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999). The following type space framework is intended to capture
such states of affairs in general.
For each self i = 1, ..., n, let Ti be a measurable space of self i’s types. Types
τi ∈ Ti are measurably associated with
1. a belief (i.e. a probability measure) βτi on the states of the world T ⊆∏n
j=1 Tj, where βτi features perfect recall, i.e. has the property that in each
state τ = (τ1, ..., τn) ∈ T , βτi
(
{(τ1, ..., τi)} ×
∏n
j=i+1 Tj
)
= 1,11,12
2. a measurable utility function uτi : X → R, that not only represents pref-
erences over choice paths x ∈ X, but also meaningfully expresses well-being
11So when no confusion may arise, we will interchangeably refer to βτi as a belief on
∏n
j=i+1 Tj .
12The space of beliefs µ on a measurable space Y is endowed with the σ-algebra generated by
the sets of the form {µ : µ (E) ≥ p} for p ∈ [0, 1] and measurable events E ⊆ Y .
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comparably across selves,13,14 and
3. a measurable best-reply function bτi : X≤i−1 → Xi, where
bτn (x≤n−1) ∈ arg maxXn uτn (x≤n−1, ·) ,
bτn−1 (x≤n−2) ∈ arg maxXn−1
∫
Tn
uτn−1 (x≤n−2, ·, bτ˜n (x≤n−2, ·)) dβτn−1 (τ˜n) ,
bτn−2 (x≤n−3) ∈ arg maxXn−2
∫
Tn−1×Tn
uτn−2
(
x≤n−3, ·, bτ˜n−1 (x≤n−3, ·)
bτ˜n
(
x≤n−3, ·, bτ˜n−1 (x≤n−3, ·)
))
dβτn−2 (τ˜n−1, τ˜n) ,
...
bτ1 (∅) ∈ arg maxX1
∫
T2×...×Tn
uτ1 (·, bτ˜2 (·) , bτ˜3 (·, bτ˜2 (·)) , ...) dβτ1 (τ˜2, ..., τ˜n) ,
for i = n, ..., 1.15,16
For (a particularly simple) example, each utility profile u = (u1, ...un) of a
sophisticated child, together with a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium (bi : X≤i−1 → Xi)ni=1
13To the latter effect, in the background there may e.g. be for each type τj of self j an
instantaneous felicity function fτj : Xj → R, so that
uτi (x1, ..., xn) =
n∑
j=1
ωτi (j)
(∫
T
(
fτj (xj)
)
dβτi
)
,
for some positive weights ωτi (j) (these weights may represent, for example, time discounting by
the type τi) or, more generally,
uτi (x1, ..., xn) =
n∑
j=1
(∫
T
∫
Xj
ωτi (x˜j ;xj) fτj (x˜j) dµτi (x˜j ;xj) dβτi
)
,
where for x˜j = xj the weight ωτi (xj ;xj) for experienced felicity is positive, and for x˜j 6= xj the
weight ωτi (x˜j ;xj) for forgone or counterfactual, unexperienced felicity is non-positive (represent-
ing regret), and where the probability measure µτi (·;xj) on Xj expresses the relative importance
that τi attaches to the experienced felicity of xj by self j versus the unexperienced, forgone felicity
of other x˜j 6= xj by self j.
14The space of utility functions is endowed with the Borel σ-algebra of the topology of pointwise
convergence.
15We need to specify bτi explicitly for each type τi ∈ Ti, because uτi and βτi on their own (i)
might sometimes be compatible with several best reply functions (when ties can be broken in
several ways), and (ii) might sometimes be compatible with no best reply function at all, when
uτi has discontinuities, or when for some j > i discontinuities in the best replies bτj of types τj in
the support of βτi hinder the expectation of uτi with respect to βτi from attaining a maximum
in Xi (see examples of such situations in Hellwig and Leininger 1987 and Hellwig et al. 1990).
Thus, τi being measurably associated with (βτi , uτi , bτi) means in particular that βτi , uτi , bτi are
mutually compatible.
16The space of best-reply functions is endowed with the Borel σ-algebra of the topology of
pointwise convergence.
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defines a type space with a single state τ = (τ1, ..., τn) where uτi = ui, βτi ({τ}) = 1
and bτi = bi for i = 1, ..., n.
In the state of the world τ = (τ1, ..., τn) the backward induction path xˆτ =
(xˆτ,1, ..., xˆτ,n) is defined inductively by
xˆτ,1 = bτ1 (∅) ,
xˆτ,2 = bτ2 (xˆτ,1) ,
xˆτ,3 = bτ3 (xˆτ,1, xˆτ,2) ,
...
xˆτ,n = bτn (xˆτ,1, xˆτ,2, ..., xˆτ,n−1) .
Since each type remembers correctly past types and choices, the (expected) well-
being levels at τ under backward induction are
uˆτ = (uˆτ1 , ..., uˆτi , ..., uˆτn)
=
( ∫
T2×...×Tn
uτ1
(
xˆ(τ1,τ˜2,...τ˜n)
)
dβτ1 (τ˜2, ..., τ˜n) , ...,
∫
Ti+1×...×Tn
uτi
(
xˆ(τ1,...τi,τ˜i+1,...τ˜n)
)
dβτi (τ˜i+1, ..., τ˜n) , ..., uτn (xˆτ )
)
.
We assume, for simplicity, that the parent knows the true, prevailing state of
the world τ , i.e. the parent knows how the beliefs, preferences and best replies of
the child are about to evolve.17 We further assume that if the parent intervenes
and induces a path x ∈ X, the parent is open and honest to the child from the
very start about the path that the child is henceforth about to follow,18 which
would therefore induce the well-being levels
uτ1 (x) , ..., uτn (x) .
At the state of the world τ = (τ1, ..., τn) ∈ T , a path x ∈ X that the parent
may induce is a Pareto improvement over backward induction if uτi (x) ≥ uˆτi for
i = 1, ..., n, and uτj (x) > uˆτj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
The state τ represents the utilities and beliefs of the child’s selves after any
information exchange between the parent and the child has already taken place.
Ex ante information exchange, to the extent that it influences the beliefs of the
17See the discussion in section 6 on relaxing this assumption.
18In section 6 we will discuss an extension, where even though the parent actually knows the
prevailing state of the world τ = (τ1, ..., τn), she can openly and honestly announce a state-
contingent policy, by which the induced action xi in period i may depend on the realized type
τ˜i in that period.
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child, amounts to altering the prevailing state of the world to some other state τ ′
∈ T .
As before, the parent has an average/aggregation function V : Rn → R over the
utility levels of the different selves i = 1, ..., n, that the parent wants to maximize.
In each state of the world τ = (τ1, ..., τn) ∈ T , this induces a utility function of the
parent vτ : X → R over choice paths, defined by
vτ (x) = V (uτ1 (x) , ..., uτn (x)) .
3 With misperceptions, Pareto-improving inter-
ventions might resiliently lack
For naive or partially naive types, who misperceive their future preferences, there
might exist no path that all selves will at least weakly prefer over (their anticipation
from) backward induction choices, with strict preference for some self. This is
demonstrated in the following example.
Example 2. With the feasible action paths and utility functions specified in
example 1 above, consider a type space with two states of the world, (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3)
and (τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3), with the beliefs
βτ˙1 {(τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3)} = 1,
βτ˙2 {(τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3)} = 1, βτ¨2 {(τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3)} = 1,
βτ˙3 {(τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3)} = 1, βτ¨3 {(τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3)} = 1,
and the utility functions
uτ˙1 = u1,
uτ˙2 = u2, uτ¨2 = u3,
uτ˙3 = uτ¨3 = u3.
The best replies of the types are uniquely determined by these beliefs and utilities,
and are computed in the appendix.
In state (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) the selves have the same utility functions as in the previ-
ous example, but self 1 naively believes that as of tomorrow the present bias will
miraculously disappear (uτ¨2 = u3); he moreover wrongly believes that this is com-
monly known: the state (τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3) , in which τ˙1 believes, is common knowledge at
(τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3).
9
Moreover, in state (τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3) the selves of all three periods, uτ˙1 , uτ¨2 and uτ¨3 ,
value equally the leisure time at periods 2 and 3. Therefore, by the principle of
optimality, the backward induction path xˆ(τ˙1,τ¨2,τ¨3) already maximizes uτ˙1 over all
possible paths. Since uτ˙1 is strictly concave, any other path x 6= xˆ(τ˙1,τ¨2,τ¨3) would
actually decrease uτ˙1 , i.e. uτ˙1 (x) < uˆτ˙1 . In other words, there exists no intervention
by the parent which would not decrease the well-being of τ˙1 in the state (τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3).
But this means that also in the state (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) there exists no Pareto-improving
parental intervention, because in period 1 type τ˙1 is mistakenly certain there that
the state is (τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3) and expects the backward induction path there xˆ(τ˙1,τ¨2,τ¨3).
However, if the parent attaches equal importance to the well-being of the child
in all three periods, i.e. has the same utility v as in example 1, there do exist
x 6= xˆ(τ˙1,τ¨2,τ¨3) with which v (x) > v
(
xˆ(τ˙1,τ˙2,τ˙3)
)
(see the details in the appendix).
Nevertheless, as long as the parent confines herself to interventions that all selves
would consider to be Pareto-improving given their (possibly misguided) beliefs,
the parent’s hands are tied.
This is not a knife-edge phenomenon. Rather, it is resilient to some perturba-
tions of self 1’s beliefs. For example, for ε > 0 small enough (in fact, for ε ≤ 1
2
),
even if τ˙1 ascribes probability ε to the prevailing state of the world (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3), i.e.
βτ˙1 {(τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3)} = ε, βτ˙1 {(τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3)} = 1− ε,
βτ˙2 {(τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3)} = 1, βτ¨2 {(τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3)} = 1,
βτ˙3 {(τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3)} = 1, βτ¨3 {(τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3)} = 1,
there still do not exist parental interventions which would be Pareto-improving
over backward induction. The details are elaborated in the appendix.
3.1 Nudge
Instead of influencing the choice path given the misperceptions of the child, the
parent can try to intervene ex ante with information, by drawing the attention of
the child at the state (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) to the actual utilities there (uτ˙1 , uτ˙2 , uτ˙3). That
would amount to altering the belief βτ˙1 of the type τ˙1, by increasing the probability
ε that it ascribes to (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3).
Such informational, non-coercive interventions are a particular form of a nudge
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008). In case the nudge is fully successful, ε = 1, the child
becomes sophisticated and anticipates correctly his forthcoming preference change.
However, as ε increases, τ˙1 becomes more disillusioned, and as a result its
expected backward-induction well-being uˆτ˙1 decreases (see the details in the ap-
pendix). Thus, even though the nudge does not interfere with the choice x of the
child by coercion or incentives, the sobering effect of the nudge causes a backlash
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to the well-being of the child in period 1, and for no ε > 0 would the nudge induce
a Pareto improvement.
4 Minimally disappointing interventions
Situations as in example 2 put the parent in a very frustrating position: due to
the child’s misperceptions about his future preferences, there is no way for the
parent to ameliorate the aggregate well-being of the child without upsetting him
at least in one period. This raises the question whether the Pareto-improvement
constraint is not too stringent under such misperceptions.
A path x which is Pareto-improving at a state of the world τ vis-a`-vis backward
induction satisfies, by definition, uτi (x)− uˆτi ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., n. A natural way
to minimally relax this constraint is to require
uτi (x)− uˆτi ≥ −δ, i = 1, ..., n, (])
for the minimal δ with which a path x satisfying (]) exists.
Then, if for this
δmin (τ) ≡ min {δ : ∃x s.t. uτi (x)− uˆτi ≥ −δ, i = 1, ..., n} ,
it is the case that
max
{x: mini=1,...,n(uτi (x)−uˆτi)≥−δmin(τ)}
v (x) > v (xˆτ ) ,
then the parent may find it legitimate to intervene and induce
x˜ ∈ arg max
{x: mini=1,...,n(uτi (x)−uˆτi)≥−δmin(τ)}
v (x)
in order to augment the aggregate well-being of the child, even though at some
period the child will be minimally disappointed, by δmin (τ).
Example 2 (continued). In the state of the world (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) there turns out to
be a unique path x˜ satisfying
uτ˙i (x)− uˆτ˙i ≥ −δmin (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) , i = 1, 2, 3
(see the details in the appendix). With this path x˜,
uτ˙1 (x˜)− uˆτ˙1 = −δmin (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) ,
uτ˙2 (x˜)− uˆτ˙2 = −δmin (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) ,
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but
uτ˙3 (x˜)− uˆτ˙3 > 2δmin (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) .
Thus,
v (x˜) > v
(
xˆ(τ˙1,τ˙2,τ˙3)
)
,
and, in terms of average well-being across the three periods, which is the parent’s
perspective, the minimally disappointing intervention is superior to backward in-
duction.
The approach proposed here may actually be applied also when Pareto im-
proving interventions over backward induction do exist. With this approach, δmin
would have the opposite sign and measure the minimal utility enhancement across
the periods. The parent would then consider inducing only Pareto improving paths
that maximally improve the minimal well-being enhancements across the differ-
ent periods. In the appendix we demonstrate how this idea is made operative in
example 1.
5 Discussion
Parent uncertainty. We assumed, for simplicity, that the parent knows correctly
the state of the world, i.e. that the parent knows the child’s preferences and beliefs
in all periods. We saw that even under such a simplifying assumption, Pareto
improving interventions might not be available to the parent. A fortiori, a parent
who, more realistically, only has some belief about the states of the world, might
have an even narrower scope for interventions which would be Pareto improving
or minimally disappointing in all the states that she considers possible. How
this scope narrows down with the parent’s uncertainty remains open for follow-up
inquiry.
State-contingent parental interventions. We assumed, again for simplicity,
that if the parent induces the child to follow a particular path x, this forthcoming
path becomes known to the child, and that very fact might upset the child in some
periods. Such upsetting could be potentially attenuated if the parent were allowed
to make state-contingent empty promises, like
‘I know you are certain that tomorrow your present bias will disappear.
I am certain that you are too optimistic about this, but if it so happens
that I was wrong and you were right, then as of tomorrow I will alter
the path so as to make it up for you as much as possible.’
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Notice, though, that comes tomorrow, it might be costly or even impossible to
verify the time preference of the child, and in such case such a promise would be
not only empty (under our assumption that the parent anticipates correctly the
future preferences of the child), but also not credible in the first place.
Alternative normative guidelines. When Pareto improving interventions are
lacking, we proposed one possible normative constraint, namely minimizing the
disappointment of the child across the time periods relative to the benchmark of
its (expected) utility under the backward induction path, that he would follow
absent of any parental intervention. An alternative normative constraint could
be maximizing the minimal overall well-being across the time periods. Or one
could even claim that in the absence of Pareto improving interventions, the parent
should simply take the lead and induce a path that maximizes the parent’s own
view of how to balance the considerations of the child’s well-being across the time
periods, without imposing on herself any further normative constraints.
To conclude, we introduced a type-space framework for beliefs (and beliefs
about beliefs, etc.) about one’s future preferences, with the implied backward
induction choice that each type will make given its belief. We proved that with
sophistication, i.e. when the state of the world is common knowledge, with all types
agreeing with one another about future preferences and beliefs, then generically a
parent has room for committing to induce paths which will Pareto-improve well-
being across the time periods.
In contrast, with misperceptions about future preferences, such Pareto-impro-
ving interventions need not exist, and even informational nudges might be nec-
essarily disillusioning at least in some time period. For such cases we proposed
a possible normative alternative to the Pareto criterion, namely minimizing the
maximal disappointment that the intervention entails across the time periods.
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Appendix
Example 1
Self 3 has no effective choice but to complete what its preceding selves haven’t
done, b3 (x1, x2) = 3− x1 − x2. By backward induction, self 2 solves
maxx2 u2 (x1, x2, b3 (x1, x2))
= maxx2
(
(24− x21) + (24− x22) + 12
(
24− (3− x1 − x2)2
))
,
leading to
b2 (x1) = 1− 1
3
x1.
Accordingly, self 1 solves
maxx1 u1 (x1, b2 (x1) , b3 (x1, b2 (x1)))
= maxx1
(
(24− x21) + 12
(
24− (1− 1
3
x1
)2)
+
1
2
(
24− (3− x1 − (1− 13x1))2)) ,
leading it to choose
xˆ1 =
15
23
= 0.652 2.
Consequently,
xˆ2 = b2 (xˆ1) =
18
23
= 0.782 6,
and
xˆ3 = b3 (xˆ1, xˆ2) =
36
23
= 1. 565 2.
Altogether, the backward induction path is xˆ =
(
15
23
, 18
23
, 36
23
)
. The corresponding
utilities are
uˆ1 = u1 (xˆ) = 46. 044,
uˆ2 = u2 (xˆ) = 57. 737, (∗)
uˆ3 = u3 (xˆ) = 68. 512,
whose average is
V (uˆ) = v (xˆ) = 57.431. (♣)
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The parent’s problem
With no normative constraints on interventions, the parent would maximize the
average utility of the three selves
v (x1, x2, x3) =
1
3
3∑
i=1
ui (x1, x2, x3) =
(
24− x21
)
+
5
6
(
24− x22
)
+
2
3
(
24− x23
)
,
subject to the physical constraint x1 + x2 + x3 = 3. This yields
x¯ ≡ (x¯1, x¯2, x¯3) =
(
30
37
,
36
37
,
45
37
)
= (0.811, 0.973, 1. 216) .
The utility levels are
u1 (x¯) = 46.13,
u2 (x¯) = 57.656, , (∗∗)
u3 (x¯) = 68.917.
whose average is
v (x¯) = 57.568, (♣♣)
is higher than without intervention, (♣).
However, comparing (∗∗) to (∗) reveals that x¯ is not a Pareto improvement
relative to the backward induction path without intervention xˆ, because u2 (x¯) <
uˆ2.
Pareto-improving interventions
If the parent restricts herself to interventions that are Pareto-improving relative
the backward induction path xˆ, the parent solves
max
x1+x2+x3=3
v (x1, x2, x3) , s.t. ui (x1, x2, x3) ≥ uˆi, i = 1, 2, 3,
yielding
x˘ ≡ (x˘1, x˘2, x˘3) = (0.780, 0.828, 1. 392) ,
with utility levels
u1 (x˘) = 46. 080,
u2 (x˘) = 57. 737, (∗ ∗ ∗)
u3 (x˘) = 68. 768,
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with lower average
v (x˘) = 57.528 < v (x¯) . (♣♣♣)
In particular, along the choice path x˘ self 1 does more of the chore relative
to the backward induction path xˆ, but (comparing (∗) with (∗ ∗ ∗) ) self 1 it is
more than happy to do so knowing that self 2 will also work harder; self 2 is just
indifferent working harder given that self 1 works harder; and self 3 is happier that
less of the largest share of the chore is left for it to complete.
Maximin intervention
If the parent restricts herself further, to an intervention that maximizes the min-
imal utility enhancement across the three selves relative to the no-intervention
backward induction path xˆ,
max
x1+x2+x3=1
min
i=1,2,3
[ui (x1, x2, x3)− uˆi] .
The maximin is attained at
x˜ ≡ (x˜1, x˜2, x˜3) = (0.739, 0.784, 1. 477),
with utility levels
u1 (x˜) = 46. 056,
uıˆτ2 (x˜) = 57. 748, (∗ ∗ ∗∗)
uıˆτ3 (x˜) = 68. 657
accruing a utility increment of 0.0115 to both self 1 and self 2 relative to the no-
intervention backward induction path, even if with an average utility across the
selves
v (x˜) = 57.487, (♣♣♣♣)
which is lower than (♣♣♣). Nevertheless, comparing with (♣) the parent realizes
that v (x˜) > v (xˆ), so she judges the maximin intervention as preferable to no
intervention at all.
Example 2
Both τ˙3 and τ¨3 have no choice but to complete the part of the chore that the
previous selves haven’t completed,
bτ˙3 (x1, x2) = bτ¨3 (x1, x2) = 3− x1 − x2.
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As for self 2, type τ¨2, who has no present bias and the same utility function u3 as
that of τ¨3, will divide the remaining chore equally among them,
bτ¨2 (x1) =
3− x1
2
,
whereas type τ˙2, who does have a present bias with the utility function u2 will,
like self 2 in example 1, choose only
bτ˙2 (x1) = 1−
1
3
x1.
The naive type τ˙1, who is certain that the subsequent types are τ¨2,τ¨3 will solve
max
x1
u1 (x1, bτ¨2 (x1) , bτ¨3 (x1, bτ¨2 (x1)))
= max
x1
((
24− x21
)
+
1
2
(
24−
(
3− x1
2
)2)
+
1
2
(
24−
(
3− x1
2
)2))
,
leading him to choose
bτ˙1 (∅) = xˆτ˙1 =
3
5
,
believing that τ¨2 and τ¨3 will divide the remaining chore equally, each choosing
6
5
.
However, at the state (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) , type τ˙2 will actually choose
xˆτ˙2 = bτ˙2 (xˆτ˙1) = 1−
1
3
· 3
5
=
4
5
,
leaving
xˆτ˙3 =
8
5
of the chore to τ˙3. At (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) the (expected) utilities will therefore be
uˆτ˙1 = uτ˙1
(
3
5
,
6
5
,
6
5
)
= 46.2,
uˆτ˙2 = uτ˙2
(
3
5
,
4
5
,
8
5
)
= 57. 72, (∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗)
uˆτ˙3 = uτ˙3
(
3
5
,
4
5
,
8
5
)
= 68. 44.
Thus, with no intervention by the parent, the resulting average utility at
(τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) will then be
V (uˆτ˙1 , uˆτ˙2 , uˆτ˙3) =
uˆτ˙1 + uˆτ˙2 + uˆτ˙3
3
= 57.453. (♣♣♣♣♣)
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There exists no Pareto improving intervention
At state (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) , no intervention can be Pareto improving over the backward
induction utility profile (uˆτ˙1 , uˆτ˙2 , uˆτ˙3), because τ˙1 believes that the state is (τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3)
in which there is (common knowledge of) time consistency of preferences, and
therefore by the principle of optimality in dynamic programming any alteration of
the action profile
(
3
5
, 6
5
, 6
5
)
chosen sequentially by τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3 would be in particular
unbeneficial from the perspective of τ˙1. Moreover, since u1 is strictly concave, any
such alteration would actually decrease u1.
The absence of Pareto improvements does not hinge on the fact that τ˙1 is
(wrongly) certain of (common knowledge of) the selves’ time consistency. To see
this, amend the above example so that type τ˙1 does assign probability ε > 0 that
there is time inconsistency. Thus:
βτ˙1 {(τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3)} = ε, βτ˙1 {(τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3)} = 1− ε,
βτ˙2 {(τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3)} = 1, βτ¨2 {(τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3)} = 1,
βτ˙3 {(τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3)} = 1, βτ¨3 {(τ˙1, τ¨2, τ¨3)} = 1.
The maximization problem of τ˙1 will now be
maxx1
(εuτ˙1 (x1, bτ˙2 (x1) , bτ¨3 (x1, bτ˙2 (x1))) +
(1− ε)uτ˙1 (x1, bτ¨2 (x1) , bτ¨3 (x1, bτ¨2 (x1)))) =
maxx1 ε((24− x21) + 12 (24− (1− 13x1)2)+ 12 (24− (3− x1 − (1− 13x1))2))
+ (1− ε)
(
(24− x21) + 12
(
24− (3−x1
2
)2)
+ 1
2
(
24− (3−x1
2
)2))
 ,
leading τ˙1 to choose
xˆτ˙1 =
3ε+ 27
ε+ 45
,
and, subsequently,
xˆτ˙2 = bτ˙2 (xˆτ˙1) = 1−
1
3
3ε+ 27
ε+ 45
=
36
ε+ 45
,
xˆτ¨2 = bτ¨2 (xˆτ˙1) =
3− 3ε+27
ε+45
2
=
54
ε+ 45
,
leaving to the last self
xˆτ˙3 =
72
ε+ 45
,
xˆτ¨3 =
54
ε+ 45
.
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Accordingly, the backward induction expected utilities at (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3) will be
uˆτ˙1 = εuτ˙1
(
3ε+27
ε+45
, 36
ε+45
, 72
ε+45
)
+
(1− ε)uτ˙1
(
3ε+27
ε+45
, 54
ε+45
, 54
ε+45
)
= 39ε+2079
ε+45
,
uˆτ˙2 = uτ˙2
(
3ε+27
ε+45
, 36
ε+45
, 72
ε+45
)
=
3(17ε2+1746ε+38 961)
(ε+45)2
,
uˆτ˙2 = uτ˙2
(
3ε+27
ε+45
, 36
ε+45
, 72
ε+45
)
=
9(7ε2+702ε+15 399)
(ε+45)2
.
Then one can verify that for ε ≤ 1
2
there exist no Pareto improvements
(x1, x2, 3− x1 − x2) over this utility tuple.
Nudge One can interpret an increase in ε as the result of an ex ante nudge,
that sobers up self 1 at least partially, and makes it consider the possibility that
its present bias need not disappear tomorrow (type τ¨2 has no present bias), but
might rather persist (type τ˙2) with probability ε.
Such a nudge, though, will decrease the well-being uˆτ˙1 of self 1 at the no-
intervention backward induction path, because
duˆτ˙1
dε
= − 324
(ε+ 45)2
< 0.
Thus, even such an informational intervention, involving no coercion or incentives,
is not Pareto improving.
Minimax intervention
With the lack of Pareto-improvements, it may still be the case, though, that by
disappointing some of the selves while cheering up others the parent can improve
upon the average utility (♣♣♣♣♣) at (τ˙1, τ˙2, τ˙3). One possibility to use the same
criterion as before, that amounts in this case to choosing a path that will minimize
the maximal disappointment vis-a-vis (∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗) across the 3 selves
min
x1+x2+x3=3
max
i=1,2,3
[uˆτ˙i − uτ˙i (x1, x2, x3)] .
The solution is
(
x˜τ˙1 , x˜τ˙2 , x˜τ˙3
)
= (0.673 4, 0.979 8, 1. 346 8) , with which τ˙1 and τ˙2
lose 0.04 04 of their utility, each, but τ˙3 gains 0.333, overall leading to the higher
average utility
v
(
x˜τ˙1 , x˜τ˙2 , x˜τ˙3
)
= 57. 537 > v
(
xˆτ˙1 , xˆτ˙2 , xˆτ˙3
)
as comparing with (♣♣♣♣♣) reveals. Thus, from the parent’s perspective this
is a worthwhile intervention.
This intervention is in some sense even more ‘benign’ than the informational
nudge considered above, because it makes sure to smooth as much as possible the
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sobering pain of disillusionment across the different periods, rather than weighing
its entire toll on the child in the first period only.
Proof of the Theorem
For simplicity, we first present the proof for the case where the choice set of each
self is one-dimensional, Xi ⊂ Rki with ki = 1, i = 1, ..., n, and then elaborate on
how to read the same proof for the case of any finite ki ≥ 1.
If xˆ = (xˆ1, ..., xˆn) is an interior subgame-perfect equilibrium path, then at xˆ
the following n first-order conditions obtain:
∂un
∂xn
= 0,
∂un−1
∂xn−1
+ ∂un−1
∂xn
∂bn
∂xn−1
= 0,
∂un−2
∂xn−2
+ ∂un−2
∂xn−1
∂bn−1
∂xn−2
+ ∂un−2
∂xn
(
∂bn
∂xn−2
+ ∂bn
∂xn−1
∂bn−1
∂xn−2
)
= 0,
...
To simplify notation in the sequel, define the matrix of direct and indirect effects
h =

1 · · ·
0 1
...
...
. . .
0 0 1 ∂bn−1
∂xn−2
(
∂bn
∂xn−2
+ ∂bn
∂xn−1
∂bn−1
∂xn−2
)
0 · · · 0 1 ∂bn
∂xn−1
0 · · · 0 1

,
so that the above system becomes, at xˆ,
Fn (x;u) ≡ ∂un
∂xn
= 0, (BIn)
Fn−1 (x;u) ≡ ∂un−1
∂xn−1
+
∂un−1
∂xn
hn−1,n = 0, (BIn-1)
Fn−2 (x;u) ≡ ∂un−2
∂xn−2
+
∂un−2
∂xn−1
hn−2,n−1 +
∂un−2
∂xn
hn−2,n = 0. (BIn-2)
...
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If xˆ is also Pareto optimal, then there exists θˆ =
(
θˆ1, ..., θˆn
)
such that at
(
xˆ, θˆ
)
G1 (x, θ;u) ≡
n∑
i=1
θi
∂ui
∂x1
= 0, (PO1)
...
Gn (x, θ;u) ≡
n∑
i=1
θi
∂ui
∂xn
= 0, (POn)
and
Gn+1 (θ) =
n∑
i=1
θ2i − 1 = 0. (POn+1)
Indeed, if there doesn’t exist
(
θˆ1, ..., θˆn
)
satisfying (POn+1) such that (PO1) , ...,
(POn) hold, the Jacobian Du has full row rank at xˆ, and one can find a direction δ1...
δn
 such that Du
 δ1...
δn
 =
 1...
1
 , so that perturbing xˆi in the direction δi
for i = 1, ..., n improves all of u1, ...un, thus constituting a Pareto improvement.
We will distinguish two families of cases: (i) when there is a minimal index
a ≥ 1 and a maximal index b > a such that θˆa 6= 0 and θˆb 6= 0; (ii) when there is
a unique index 1 ≤ c ≤ n for which θˆc 6= 0 while θˆj = 0 ∀j 6= c.
For every case of the first family, we will show that for every perturbation
direction (pi1, ..., pin, p1, ..., pn, pn+1) for (F1, ..., Fn, G1, ...Gn, Gn+1) there exists
Y =
 y11 · · · y1n... ...
yn1 · · · ynn
 ∈ Rn×n,
such that, with the path of utility tuples
ut =
 u
t
1
...
utn
 ≡ u+ tY
 x1...
xn

defined for t ∈ [−ε, ε] for some ε > 0, and with
Gtn+1 = Gn+1 + tpn+1,
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we get at t = 0
∂F1 (xˆ;u
0)
∂t
= pi1,
...
∂Fn (xˆ;u
0)
∂t
= pin,
∂G1
(
xˆ, θˆ;u0
)
∂t
= p1,
...
∂Gn
(
xˆ, θˆ;u0
)
∂t
= pn,
∂G0n+1
(
θˆ
)
∂t
= pn+1.
The last equation is immediate by the definition of Gtn+1. For the first 2n equations
to hold, choose
Y =

pi1 0 · · · 0 · · · 0
0
. . . 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
p1−θˆ1pi1
θˆa
· · · · · · pia −
n∑
i=a+1
pi−θˆipii
θˆa
ha,i · · · pb−θˆbpibθˆa · · ·
pn−θˆnpin
θˆa
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · · · ·
pa−θˆa
(
pia−
n∑
i=a+1
pi−θˆipii
θˆa
ha,i
)
θˆb
0 pib 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · · · · 0 0 pin

.
In words,
1. for i 6= a, set yii = pii, thus perturbing Fi at t = 0 by pii for i 6= a,
2. for i 6= a, (1) per.turbs Gi at t = 0 by θˆipii, so set yai = pi−θˆipiiθˆa in order to
eventually end up perturbing Gi at t = 0 by pi,
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3. together over all i 6= a, (2) upsets Fa at t = 0 by
∑
i>a
pi−θˆipii
θˆa
ha,i (only, ha,i
itself was not perturbed, because it depends on partial cross-derivatives of
ur w.r.t. xs for r > s > a, and these were not perturbed) and, in order to
eventually perturb Fi at t = 0 by pia, set yaa = pia −
∑
i>a
pi−θˆipii
θˆa
ha,i and,
4. finally, (3) upsets Ga at t = 0 by θˆa
(
pia −
∑
i>a
pi−θˆipii
θˆa
ha,i
)
, so in order to
eventually perturb Ga at t = 0 by pa, set
yba =
pa − θˆa
(
pia −
∑
i>a
pi−θˆipii
θˆa
ha,i
)
θˆb
,
which does not upset Fb, which only depends on partial derivatives of uib
w.r.t. xs for s ≥ b, whereas a < b), while
5. all the remaining entries of Y are zero.
Therefore, by the transversality theorem there exists an open and dense subset
Ua,b ⊆ U of utility profiles u for which at any solution
(
xˆ, θˆ
)
of
(BI1) , ..., (BIn) , (PO1) , ..., (POn) , (POn+1) ,
for which arg mini
(
θˆi 6= 0
)
= a and arg maxi
(
θˆi 6= 0
)
= b, the (2n+ 1) × 2n
matrix 
∂F1(xˆ;u)
∂x1
· · · ∂F1(xˆ;u)
∂xn
∂F1(xˆ;u)
∂θ1
· · · ∂F1(xˆ;u)
∂θn
...
...
...
...
∂Fn(xˆ;u)
∂x1
· · · ∂Fn(xˆ;u)
∂xn
∂Fn(xˆ;u)
∂θ1
· · · ∂Fn(xˆ;u)
∂θn
∂G1(xˆ,θˆ;u)
∂x1
· · · ∂G1(xˆ,θˆ;u)
∂xn
∂G1(xˆ,θˆ;u)
∂θ1
· · · ∂G1(xˆ,θˆ;u)
∂θn
...
...
...
...
∂Gn(xˆ,θˆ;u)
∂x1
· · · ∂Gn(xˆ,θˆ;u)
∂xn
∂Gn(xˆ,θˆ;u)
∂θ1
· · · ∂Gn(xˆ,θˆ;u)
∂θn
∂Gn+1(θˆ)
∂x1
· · · ∂Gn+1(θˆ)
∂xn
∂Gn+1(θˆ)
∂θ1
· · · ∂Gn+1(θˆ)
∂θn

(F)
has full row rank.19
As for cases of the second family, where at a solution
(
xˆ, θˆ
)
, θˆc is the only
non-zero entry in θˆ, (PO1) , ..., (POn) amount to ∇uc =
(
∂uc
∂x1
, ..., ∂uc
∂xn
)
= 0, which
19Hirsch (1976), p. 74, theorem 2.1 (b), with M = R2n, N = R2n+1, L = X × [0, 1]n and
A = {0}. For this case the theorem then states that t2X×[0,1]n
(
R2n,R2n+1; {0}) is open and
dense within C2
(
R2n,R2n+1
)
.
24
turns (BIc) to an identity, 0 = 0. In such a case renounce therefore the expression
Fc, but also read the remaining 2n expressions (Fj)j 6=c , (Gi)
n+1
i=1 as functions of the
n + 1 variables x1, ..., xn, θc only, i.e. with θj ≡ 0 for j 6= c. Then for every
corresponding rates of perturbation
(
(pij)j 6=c , (pi)
n+1
i=1
)
, if we choose
Y =

pi1 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 · · · pij · · · 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
p1
θˆc
· · · pj
θˆc
· · · pc
θˆc
pn
θˆc
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · pin

,
then at t = 0 we have
∂Fj(xˆ;u0)
∂t
= pij for j 6= c, ∂Gi(xˆ,θˆc;u
0)
∂t
= pi for i = 1, ..., n, and
∂G0n+1(θˆc)
∂t
= pn+1.
Therefore, by the transversality theorem there exists an open and dense subset
Uc ⊆ U of utility profiles u for which at any solution
(
xˆ, θˆ
)
of
(BI1) , ..., (BIn) , (PO1) , ..., (POn) , (POn+1) ,
for which θˆc 6= 0 and θˆj = 0 for j 6= c, the 2n× (n+ 1) matrix
∂F1(xˆ;u)
∂x1
· · · ∂F1(xˆ;u)
∂xn
∂F1(xˆ;u)
∂θc
...
...
...
∂Fc−1(xˆ;u)
∂x1
· · · ∂Fc−1(xˆ;u)
∂xn
∂Fc−1(xˆ;u)
∂θc
∂Fc+1(xˆ;u)
∂x1
· · · ∂Fc+(xˆ;u)
∂xn
∂Fc+(xˆ;u)
∂θc
...
...
...
∂Fn(xˆ;u)
∂x1
· · · ∂Fn(xˆ;u)
∂xn
∂Fn(xˆ;u)
∂θc
∂G1(xˆ,θˆc;u)
∂x1
· · · ∂G1(xˆ,θˆc;u)
∂xn
∂G1(xˆ,θˆc;u)
∂θc
...
...
...
∂Gn(xˆ,θˆc;u)
∂x1
· · · ∂Gn(xˆ,θˆc;u)
∂xn
∂Gn(xˆ,θˆc;u)
∂θc
∂Gn+1(θˆc)
∂x1
· · · ∂Gn+1(θˆc)
∂xn
∂Gn+1(θˆc)
∂θc

(FF)
has full row rank.
The intersection of the finitely many open and dense sets
U0 =
( ⋂
1≤a<b≤n
Ua,b
)
∩
(
n⋂
c=1
Uc
)
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is open and dense. For every utility tuple u ∈ U0, at every solution
(
xˆ, θˆ
)
of
(BI1) , ..., (BIn) , (PO1) , ..., (POn) , (POn+1) , either (F) or (FF) has full row
rank, which is impossible because both (F) and (FF) have more rows than
columns. Hence for generic u (namely for u ∈ U0), no interior backward induction
SPE path xˆ is Pareto optimal.
When choice variables are multi-dimensional, xi = (xi,1, ..., xi,ki) , i = 1, ..., n,
the same proof applies verbatim with the following caveats: ∂ui
∂xj
=
(
∂ui
∂xj,1
, ... ∂ui
∂xj,kj
)
,
∂bi
∂xj
=

∂bi,1
∂xj,1
· · · ∂bi,1
∂xj,kj
...
...
∂bi,ki
∂xj,1
· · · ∂bi,ki
∂xj,kj
, Fi = (Fi,1, ..., Fi,ki), ∂Fi∂xj =

∂Fi,1
∂xj,1
· · · ∂Fi,1
∂xj,kj
...
...
∂Fi,ki
∂xj,1
· · · ∂Fi,ki
∂xj,kj
 ,
pii = (pii,1, ..., pii,ki), Gi = (Gi,1, ..., Gi,ki),
∂Gi
∂xj
=

∂Gi,1
∂xj,1
· · · ∂Gi,1
∂xj,kj
...
...
∂Gi,ki
∂xj,1
· · · ∂Gi,ki
∂xj,kj
 , pi =
(pi,1, ..., pi,ki), δi = (δi,1, ..., δi,ki); θi remains a scalar. 
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